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The President and International
Financial Regulation
David Zaring *
The president’s powers in foreign relations have long been
touted as strong, but for international financial regulation, they
are at their lowest ebb. Congress does not defer in it. The
domestic agencies involved, in particular the Federal Reserve,
are independent, and in this way less easy for the president to
influence. And the international process, featuring technocratic
collaboration by bureaucrats, is also not amenable to dispositive
presidential supervision. The good news for the president,
however, is that the perceived need for political oversight of
international financial regulation has led to a new role for the
G-20, of which he is an influential member. It is not
authoritative command, but it may afford him more of a role in
a process that, until the financial crisis, proceeded without much
presidential input.

The president’s role in setting foreign policy is usually regarded as
commanding, but in international economic law presidential authority
is, if anything, at its lowest ebb. 1 Rather than enjoying the authority
to act alone presumed by cases such as United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 2 the president’s power-sharing role in economic
relations is constitutionally constrained, as well as structurally
encouraged. This short essay explains the reasons for the reduced
executive role and identifies one route to more influence that is
developing in the field—increased oversight of international financial
regulation by the G-20, an informal grouping of heads of state of
which the president is a member.
*

Assistant Professor, The Wharton School. Thanks to participants in the
workshop at Case Western and to Michael Carnevale for research
assistance.

1.

Justice Jackson defined the “lowest ebb” as “[w]hen the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress
. . . for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).

2.

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936) (“[I]f, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment . . . is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,
congressional legislation . . . must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom . . . which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.”).
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While often the Constitution has been used to justify broad,
almost plenary authority in foreign affairs, it does not afford the
president as much comfort in any kind of economic regulation.
Instead, the Constitution gives Congress the express power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” 3 In international economic
law, Congress has used that power vigorously, passing laws
establishing tariff rates, implementing trade agreements, and even
creating some barriers to trade, such as the trade in “critical
infrastructure” that implicates national security. 4 When Congress has
delegated some of its authority to set trade policy to the president, it
has often limited its delegations through regular use of the sunset
clause. 5
In the critical arena of finance, and the supervision of it, the
president’s power is even more limited, even though, as the last
financial crisis has made clear, finance is critical to the country’s
prosperity (and also to the president’s job prospects). The legal
limitations requiring the president to share economic lawmaking
power are paired with a number of structural impediments to the
exercise of any additional power by him.
One such impediment lies in the president’s authority over his
own financial bureaucracy. American policy in international financial
regulation has traditionally been set not by the President and his
delegates in the State Department, but largely by independent
agencies, including the Federal Reserve (perhaps the most
independent of all government agencies), the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.6
These agencies are led by multi-member boards, whose members are
subject to Senate confirmation, and, once confirmed, cannot be
3.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.

4.

See generally David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification
Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81 (2009) (explaining how Congress has
inserted itself into foreign policy through extensive oversight of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an executive
branch organization).

5.

For discussions of the merits of sunset clauses, see Roberta Romano,
Regulating in the Dark 14–25 (Yale Law Sch., Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research & Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Paper No. 442, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148. For a critique, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1033–37 (2012).

6.

The Treasury Department, which certainly does enjoy presidential
oversight, also plays a critical role. See David Zaring, Administration by
Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 187 (2010) (“The Treasury Department
pulled out all the stops during the beginning and middle of the financial
crisis, and toward the end, when Congress got involved, its efforts got
even more dramatic.”).
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removed by the president without cause. 7 They do not report to the
Office of Management and Budget, and therefore do not have to
coordinate their regulatory agendas with White House priorities. 8
It is also difficult for the executive branch, even apart from these
domestic impediments, to affect the increasingly international process
that now characterizes the most important portions of financial
regulation. The amount of capital banks must hold in reserve to deal
with emergencies or shocks, for example, is not set by the president or
even by the independent agencies that, if not under his supervision,
are at least located in his jurisdiction. 9 Instead, capital adequacy
requirements have been set through an increasingly international
process in which American agencies participate, but do not control. It
is the so-called Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) making those rules, rather than the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury Department. 10 American regulators, including the
presidentially responsive Treasury Department, can affect the rules as
participants in the Basel Committee process. 11 But the president far
from controls it, as he does not control the Federal Reserve or the
Securities and Exchange Commission, let alone their interactions with
foreign financial regulators, out of which the Basel rules are forged.
The Basel Committee has come up with three iterations of its capital
adequacy rules; 12 the first two were never endorsed by the president.
Further, the president, and all participants in the emerging world
of international financial law are increasingly constrained by some
7.

See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 621 (1935)
(preventing presidents from removing the heads of independent agencies
without a showing of cause).

8.

As Josh Wright has observed, “[p]residents have traditionally declined
to exercise authority, through the OMB, over independent agencies.”
Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two
Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2268 n.195
(2012).

9.

See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial
Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683, 696–97 (2012) (discussing the
development of the Basel Capital Accord, which is designed to ensure
banks are adequately capitalized) [hereinafter Zaring, Finding Legal
Principle in Global Financial Regulation]; David Zaring, Rulemaking
and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
563, 580–85 (2008) (analyzing the Basel Accord as a strong example of
international rulemaking); see generally International Regulatory
Framework for Banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).

10.

See Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation,
supra note 9, at 686–87.

11.

See id. at 697 (noting regulators may comment on Basel Committee
rules and that the Committee is responsive to such comments).

12.

Id. at 696.
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developing bedrock principles that underpin the legal process. All of
the important global regulatory bodies involved with finance operate
on principles of consensus, for example. 13 Consensus creates the
potential for hold-outs, thus empowering the relative minnows that
participate at the expense of the sorts of superpowers led by
American presidents.
Other principles require conduct by financial regulators that leave
presidents with very little discretion to act. A national treatment
paradigm, for example, animates much of the work done in financial
regulation. National treatment provides that regulators will not treat
their own banks, insurance companies, or broker deals better or
differently than the way they treat foreign banks, insurance
companies, or broker deals. 14 In financial regulation, it has been
paired with a most favored nation principle. 15 Every member of the
Basel Committee—there are now 20 members, comprising most of the
sophisticated economies of the world—is accordingly committed to,
and gets the benefit from, the deal that every other member gets. 16 In
short, the regulations to be imposed on the banks of Britain by the
United States are the same regulations that will be imposed on the
banks of every other member of the Basel Committee.
These sorts of principles have also diminished presidential control
in other international economic unions. The president’s authority over
trade policy was limited by the institutionalization of the World
Trade Organization, with its own national treatment and most
favored nation paradigms that prevent presidents from playing
favorites in economic regulation. 17 The European Union, like the
financial regulators, believes in subsidiarity—the delegation of
policymaking to the lowest possible level—a level frequently below the
European executive’s close reach. 18
13.

See Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation,
supra note 9, at 706.

14.

See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, REGULATORY GUIDE FOR FOREIGN
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2005) (noting that foreign banks will
be afforded the same powers and subjected to the same limitation as
national banks under the “national treatment” policy).

15.

See Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation,
supra note 9, at 706 (describing the most favored nation principle in the
financial regulation context).

16.

See id. at 706–07.

17.

See David E. Sanger, A Blink from the Bush Administration, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at A28; Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Tariffs on Steel Are
Illegal, World Trade Organization Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at
A1.

18.

See Subsidiarity, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/
industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/SUBSIDIARITY.htm
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But there is more to these principles than the difficulties posed by
those of them that delegate power away from any single head of state
(or in Europe’s case, a commission). The developing welter of rules
and the increasing systemization of international financial law also
constrain presidents. To the extent that the rules on global finance
look less like negotiations and more like a legal system from which
derogation is impermissible and amendment difficult, then the
president’s power—not to mention that of the American delegates
more intimately involved in the process—to affect the terms will be
increasingly handicapped.
But the news for enthusiasts for presidential power is not entirely
bad. In the wake of the financial crisis the G-20, which is comprised
of the heads of states of the twenty most important market
economies, has become a real and substantial overseer of the process
of international financial regulation. 19 The G-20, a purely political
organization that might be likened to a Concert of Europe for the
modern era, consists of heads of state that meet annually and finance
ministers who meet biannually, to deal with the global economy. 20
The G-20 sets the schedule and issues areas that international
financial regulators must address. 21 While the president hardly
controls the G-20, he plays a critical part in it.
The G-20 has grown out of the smaller and still extant western
head-of-state meetings begun in the 1970s, the G-6 and G-7. 22 These
organizations had a reputation as talking shops and were founded in
part as get-to-know-you affairs for the important anti-communist
world leaders. 23
In the midst of the financial crisis, however, it was the G-20 that
provided much of the leadership for the global response, such as it
was. At head-of-state summits in Pittsburgh and London in 2009, the
(last updated Nov. 30, 2010); Gráinne de Búrca, Reappraising
Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam 17–22 (Harvard Jean
Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & Reg’l Econ. Law & Just., Working Paper 7/99,
1999), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/pap
ers/99/990701.html.
19.

For an overview of the G-20, see generally John Kirton, The G20, the
G2, the G5 and the Role of Ascending Powers (G20 Research Grp. &
G8 Research Grp., Dec. 27, 2010), available at www.g20.utoronto.
ca/biblio /kirton-g20-g8-g5.pdf.

20.

See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10
CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 493 (2010). Members may scale the regular
meetings back to annual ones, as they grow more confident that the
financial crisis is behind them. Id. at 496.

21.

See Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation,
supra note 9, at 692–93.

22.

See Zaring, supra note 20, at 493–94.

23.

Id. at 494.
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G-20 agreed that it would make a priority of the international
regulatory coordinative process. 24
In those meetings, the G-20 mandated the creation of the
Financial Stability Board, a network designed to coordinate
international financial regulation. 25 It also set an agenda for the Board
and the underlying networks regarding reform of the financial
regulatory system. The G-20 directed financial regulators to increase
the capital requirements for banks, create a more centralized process
for the trading of derivatives, explore ways to “resolve” (that is,
quickly fail and recapitalize) insolvent banks, and look into the ways
that executive compensation at these institutions incentivized risk. 26
Because of these directives, the G-20 appears to have taken on an
important role in setting the agenda for post-crisis financial
regulation. The G-20 has followed up on the progress made on its
agenda by insisting on progress reports from financial regulators at
subsequent meetings; indeed, financial regulatory reforms, in addition
to macroeconomic surveillance, global warming, and ire about offshore tax havens have comprised the bulk of the G-20’s stated
agenda. 27
This is quite a change from the way that international financial
regulation used to work, and it is a change that gives the president
more of a voice in this critical area. Since 1974, when this process got
underway, the weltanschauung has been technocratic, and politically
insulated bureaucratic collaboration. The process of setting global
rules for accounting, bank safety, and insurance practices were
regulatory affairs in which political involvement appears to be
minimized. 28 However, the advent of the G-20’s oversight has changed
that dynamic.
The result is that financial regulation has a political overseer,
and, as the top of the increasingly elaborate post-crisis pyramid of
international regulation, it is a unique example of political oversight
in international governance. It is also the kind of circumstance that
24.

Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial
Regulation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1594 (2011).

25.

See Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial
Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of
International Financial Regulation, 32 UNSW L.J. 488, 489–90 (2009)
(describing the formation of the Financial Stability Forum, which was
later “reconstituted” as the Financial Stability Board).

26.

Huw Jones, G20Task Force Ups Derivatives Reform Pressure, REUTERS
(June 15, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/15/g20-der
ivatives-idUSL5E8HF2UL20120615 (discussing the timeline and process
for introducing such derivatives rules).

27.

See Arner, supra note 24, at 1588–91.

28.

See generally David Zaring, What Can International Law Learn from
International Financial Regulation? (Working Paper, 2012).
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does not afford the president the sort of absolute power he may enjoy
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces 29 or the country’s principal
agent in managing foreign affairs, 30 but it does give him an important
role to play in one of the most interesting developments in
international law in the last forty years.

29.

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2049 (2005)
(discussing the commander-in-chief authority).

30.

For discussions of the President’s strong foreign affairs hand,
particularly vis-à-vis Congress, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1257 (1988); Saikrishna B.
Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234 (2001).
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